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Vieda Skultans
There is a dialogue, the exact nature of  which is difficult to define. There
are seemingly two relationships contained in one – that between informant
and the historian, and that between the informant and his own historical
consciousness. (Grele 1998, 45.)
How different the process of  canonizing a very ordinary life is from
what anthropologists or oral historians do. (Feuchtwang 1998, 126.)
A while back Clifford Geertz wrote a chapter on the blurring of  genres (Geertz
1993). Nowhere is this more apparent than in the relationship between Ethnography
and Oral History: we find ethnographers grappling with memory and representations
of the past and oral historians confronting issues to do with experience and the co-
construction of  dialogue. In the spirit of  this blurring of  disciplinary boundaries, I
would like to focus on a number of  theoretical and methodological issues that beset
both Anthropology and Oral History. In the process I hope to identify what they can
offer the other and how each can, through dialogue, diminish the other’s shortcomings.
Although oral historians are interested in the past and ethnographers by and
large in the present, the starting point for both is a compelling engagement with the
lives of  others. The end point, however, is an academic text that must both encompass
the face-to-face encounter and yet address an academic audience in a language with
which they are familiar. The questions that haunt us as we write are the ways in which
our material can be made relevant to the academic subject and how it can advance
theory. These problems are not usually ones that concern our informants. My paper,
therefore, seeks to address some of  the problems that beset both oral historians and
ethnographers as they seek to reconcile a dual allegiance to the experiential encounter
and its textual transformation.
Narrative does not require selling as Michael Bell reminds us, least of  all to
oral historians, but it does require careful handling (Bell 1990, 172). With this caution
in mind I would like to outline three overlapping theoretical domains, which both
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oral historians and ethnographers must traverse as they seek to move from experience
to text. The first domain concerns the nature of  the engagement of  the researcher in
the field situation. The second concerns the engagement of  individuals with communal
or structural forms of  life and the epistemological and ethical implications of  such
engagement. And the third domain concerns issues of  interpretation and translation
across different modalities. Each of  these domains touches upon the other two
domains as I shall show.
ETHNOGRAPHIC ENGAGEMENT IN PLACE OF OBJECTIVITY
Let me start by considering the role of  the researcher. The illusion of  the omniscient,
objective observer has, of  course, lost ground, but the elision of  objectivity with
truth still persists, and has served to disguise the ambiguities and confusions
surrounding the meanings and uses of  objectivity. We learn to impose an artificial
order on the world and then come to equate that with objectivity.
But as the philosopher Thomas Nagel points out our lives are not lived
through the mediation of  an external observer: “Life is lived from inside, and issues
of  significance are significant only if  they can be raised from inside.” (Nagel 1991,
197.) He argues that there is something irreducible about subjectivity and that it cannot
be captured by causal or functional explanations. Nagel illustrates the non-reducibility
of  consciousness by using the example of  the bat.
“Even without the benefit of  philosophical reflection anyone who has spent
some time in an enclosed space with an excited bat knows what it is to encounter a
fundamentally alien form of  life.” (Nagel 1991, 168.) No amount of  understanding
of  the brain mechanisms of  the bat will tell us what it feels like to be a bat. There is an
explanatory gap because physical accounts leave out subjectivity. Our own limited
human experience precludes us from understanding the experience of the bat.
Experience is necessarily subjective and as Nagel points out the very idea of  an
objective experience is nonsensical.
It is difficult to understand what could be meant by the objective character
of  an experience, apart from the particular point of  view from which the
subject apprehends it. After all, what would be left of  what it was like to
be a bat if  one removed the viewpoint of  the bat? (Nagel 1991, 173.)
Ignoring the viewpoint of  the bat takes us further away rather than closer to
understanding its reality. Informants pose equally difficult challenges, though not
quite as insuperable as those of  bats. The problems are not simply to do with
understanding other minds and other cultures, but concern the dialogical nature of
understanding and narrative construction. Subjectivity never exists in isolation but
always in relationship. As Michael Agar reminds us, “an ethnographer carries more
baggage than a tape-recorder and a toothbrush.” (Agar 1996, 91.) That baggage may
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be less tangible but is no less important, than the contents of  his or her suitcase.
Each of  us comes to the ethnographic interview with his or her own personal history
and cultural baggage, and the knowledge that we acquire from others is thus necessarily
perspectival. This is in no sense a shortcoming, but it does mean that we need to pay
attention to our own cultural and biographical backgrounds. This, of  course, presents
a different scenario from that enacted in the classical fieldwork texts, which are
constructed around a duality of  observer and observed. The duality is typically
represented by describing the moment of  arrival in an alien culture. Amanda Coffey
is particularly insightful on this subject: “The fieldworker initially and purposely divests
him/herself  of  knowledge and personhood in order to achieve eventual understanding.
[..] The heroic displacement of  the ethnographer to the margins of  the culture in
question, and to the social position of  an ignoramus, is a preliminary to an even more
heroic achievement of  knowledge and understanding at the centre of  the culture.
(Coffey 1999, 20.)
According to this research paradigm distance, estrangement and marginality
are prerequisites for staying at the analytic cutting edge. So why are over identification
and familiarity seen as a problem as so many handbooks attest? The answer lies, I
believe in a negative perception of  emotion and the equation of  objectivity with a
denial of  emotion. Whilst there is an acknowledgment that we need rapport and
empathy there is a fear of  too much rapport. But as Sheryl Kleinman and Martha A.
Copp demonstrate denial of emotion is not the same as emotional freedom:
When we ignore our uncomfortable feelings we might think we have
achieved the proper emotional state for analytic distance. Feeling distant,
indifferent or numb makes us believe that we have freed ourselves from
feelings and thus can be objective [..]
But the emotional state we value will inhibit analysis. Moving from anger
to distance need not mean that our head now controls our heart. Distance
can indicate that we are numb to our feelings. [..] Numbness may protect
the individual from experiencing particular feelings but numbness itself
is an overpowering feeling state. It involves a reduction not an
enhancement, of  our cognitive faculties. (Kleinman & Copp 1993, 33.)
What matters more than the amount and intensity of  our feelings is what we do with
them and how much self  awareness they engender (Kleinman & Copp 1993, 45).
This perspective provides us with a rejoinder to the standard criticism of  reflexive
ethnography as self  absorbed and narcissistic. For as Babcock argues the problem
with Narcissus was not that he was too taken up with his own image, but that he was
not taken up enough. In other words, he was not critical enough (Babcock 1980, 2).
Reflexivity, according to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, concerns “knowing how
we are grafted onto the universal by that which is most our own” (Merleau-Ponty
1964, 52). From the phenomenological perspective no hard and fast line can be drawn
between subjectivity and the objective world. The external world comes into being
through the experiential self.
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These problems of  engagement with fieldwork are not of  course confined
to the discipline of  Anthropology. They confront oral historians also as Ronald J.
Grele has noted:
Oral history, almost alone among the various practices of  historiography
is heavily dependent upon fieldwork, which means that not only can we
come back again and again to our sources and ask them to tell us more,
but we can also explore the varieties of  historical visions in far greater
detail amid radically changing historical conditions. (Grele 1998, 47–48.)
Because of  this dependence on fieldwork oral historians are faced with the same
problems regarding self  and emotion and have to perform a fine balancing act between
identification and indifference, between sameness and indifference. Alessandro Portelli
is well aware of  this when he writes of  the fear that: “Once the floodgates of  orality
are opened, writing (and rationality with it) will be swept out.” (Portelli 1998, 64.)
What I am suggesting is that emotion has been feared because it threatens the self
other divide but that its suppression created an ethnography of  cardboard figures, or
“outlines waiting to be filled” to use Clifford Geertz’s apt description.
If  the anthropologist Edmund Leach was able to claim that the “individual’s
feelings are inaccessible to the anthropological investigator (or to any other kind of
investigator)”, it was because his own feelings were inaccessible to him (Leach 1984,
360). The immediacy of  the ethnographic counter and the compelling nature of  our
informants’ accounts require us to be aware of  our emotions and their potential
impact and shaping of  the ethnographic data.
DOES BEING “A HALFIE” HELP?
One way of  trying to resolve the problem of  sameness and difference and of
engagement and distance is through the notion of  “a halfie” introduced by the
American Egyptian anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod (1991). Born of  Egyptian parents
but educated in North America she considers herself  to belong to two cultures. There
are increasing numbers of  such “halfies” among ethnographers and, of  course, they
predominate among oral historians, who are less likely to study exotic distant peoples’
and more likely to carry out their studies closer to home. Dorinne Kondo (1990), an
American Japanese anthropologist did fieldwork in Japan, Barbara Myerhoff  (1978),
an American- Jewish anthropologist worked in a Jewish old people’s centre, and Ruth
Behar (1996) returned to her Hispanic roots through her fieldwork. These “halfies”
write ethnographies in “a different voice” to transpose Carol Gilligan’s (1982) phrase,
where room is made for the creative differences and particularities of  individuals and
their lives. Myerhoff  writes of  her fieldwork experience thus: “Working with one’s
own society, and more specifically, those of  one’s own ethnic and familial heritage, is
perilous, and much more difficult. Yet it has a certain validity and value not available
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in other circumstances. Identifying with the ‘Other’ – Indians, Chicanos, if  one is
Anglo, blacks if  one is white, males if  one is female – is an act of  imagination, a
means for discovering what one is not and never will be. Identifying with what one is
now and will be someday is quite a different process.” (Myerhoff  1978, 18.) And in
my case, as an emigree Latvian, identifying with what might have been is an equally
unsettling and, indeed, uncanny experience. Geertz, in his introduction to Myerhoff ’s
book refers to her as thrice-born. The first birth being into one’s natal culture, the
second birth being the ethnographic encounter with the exotic, and the third birth
being a return to one’s own culture with new eyes which make the familiar exotic.
One brand of  “halfie” ethnography relates to illness and here “halfies” have
produced some spectacular work. Susan Sontag (1983) has written that we are all
citizens of  two kingdoms: the kingdom of  the well and the kingdom of  the ill.
Although we prefer to travel with the well passport, each one of  us will be forced at
some stage to use our other passports. Arthur Frank and Robert Murphy have
demonstrated the experiential purchase that such dual citizenship confers (Frank
1995; 2001; Murphy 1990).
Technically “halfie” refers to ethnographers whose roots are in the society
they are researching. But as Michael Agar points out we are all “halfies” nowadays.
“Ethnographers and others swim in the same interconnected global soup.” (Agar
1996, 21.) But at a more fundamental level we are all halfies now because the myth of
the other has been shown to be just that, it has been exposed. The power relationship
between researcher and informant is no longer set in stone. And yet the researcher’s
relationship to key informant is full of  emotional and ethical dilemmas:
The feminist sociologist Judith Stacey reveals her ambivalent position over
an informant’s death providing her, as it does, with rich fieldwork opportunities. Stacey
has argued that it is precisely the closeness engendered by feminist ethnographic
practice that is responsible for “inauthenticity, dissimilitude, and potential, perhaps
inevitable, betrayal”. (Stacey 1991, 113–114.) Emotional connectedness and empathic
understanding should not disguise the fact that the ethnographer and informant have
different motivations in participating in the research. Miriam Glucksman describes
this as: “the different and unequal relation to knowledge of  the researched and
researcher.” (Glucksman 1994, 159.) Re-naming informants respondents or participants
does not empower them in any real sense. It may simply be a way of  “attempting to
establish an egalitarianism in the research situation as a substitute for establishing it
in the ‘real world’” (Glucksman 1994, 151). And as Smith argues obtaining approval
for sociological texts is often not real approval but a form of  capitulation (Frank
2001, 356).
 I suppose to be honest I would have to recognize that one’s motives are
always a varying mixture of  the personal and the altruistic and that it is their
combination that matters particularly as it affects the practice of  ethnography at
particular moments. If  at the most painful culmination of  a patient’s story my concern
is for my tape-recorder rather than the patient then there is clearly something wrong
with the combination. These are the dilemmas of  witnessing that Ruth Behar attempts
to identify. She writes: “In the midst of  a massacre, in the face of  torture, in the eye
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of  a hurricane, in the aftermath of  an earthquake, or even, say, when horror looms
apparently more gently, in memories that won’t recede and so come pouring forth in
the late-night quiet of  a kitchen, as a storyteller opens her heart to a story listener,
recounting hurts that cut deep and raw into the gullies of  the self, do you, the observer,
stay behind the lens of  the camera, switch on the tape recorder, keep pen in hand?
Are there limits – of  respect, piety, pathos – that should not be crossed, even to leave
a record.” (Behar 1996, 2.) Her way of  resolving such dilemmas is not to separate the
ethnographic voice from the personal and emotional voice, but to write personally
and vulnerably (Behar 1996, 17).
SHOULD WE “THINK WITH STORIES”?
And yet despite the ambiguities of  the ethnographic encounter there is an emotional
immediacy and power that all researchers will be familiar with. Arthur Frank has
identified this power in his distinction between “thinking with stories” rather than
“thinking about stories” (Frank 1995; 2001). So what is the difference? As I understand
this distinction “thinking with” stories makes room for a greater degree of  empathy
with the storyteller which in turn makes demands upon our moral imagination.
“Thinking with” stories is an experiential and transformative process. When
confronted with the pain and suffering of  others, stories exert a moral obligation on
the listener not to turn away but to acknowledge and share (Morris 2002, 197). Much
of  the literature on “thinking with stories” derives from the work of  Levinas and his
concept of  face.
And this kind of  thinking is transformative. John Shotter is very good on
this transformative process: “What the voices of  others can do for us that we cannot
do for ourselves, is that their otherness which enters into us makes us other. They can
arouse a dialogically structured response in us, they can create possibilities of  change
within us that we cannot create within ourselves alone.” (Shotter 2004, 8.) Shotter
refers to this kind of  understanding as relational rather than representational. Our
informants expect relational understanding rather not duplication in our responses.
This kind of  relational response is difficult to pin down but I suspect it determines
the difference between research that yields thick and thin descriptions, or between
rich and skeletal narratives.
Thus stories exert a claim or a call upon our moral imagination and compel
us to listen. Adriana Cavarero writes of  the way “who-questions” often collapse into
“what-questions” (Cavarero 2000). If  we ask of  someone who they are, it is easier to
reply by describing what they are: a teacher, a UK citizen, a white woman etc. But
“who-questions” can only be answered by giving a narrative account, a story of  past
experience and how they came to be the person that they are. A life story invites us to
think with stories. By contrast if  we think about stories we do not engage the moral
imagination in the same way. A good example of  thinking about stories is William
Labov’s (1977) classic study of  language use among inner city youths. Labov’s intention
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was to rehabilitate colloquial language, but in the process of  analysis he succeeds in
dismantling any power it might have had. In thinking about stories, in dismembering
them he succeeds in reducing them.
There are many other examples of  thinking about stories. What they have in
common is a translation from one modality to another. We could describe this as a
translation from an experiential narrative to theoretical discourse. Theory involves
removing the narrative account which constructs meaning in its own terms, to another
context where meaning is constructed in extra-local terms. Usually thinking about
stories involves seeing the story as an example of  a particular kind of  mentality. For
example, primitive mentality, or psychopathological mentality. Here language is seen
as a symptom rather than sign. Even Labov’s work which is about linguistic creativity
sees inner city discourse as an exemplar of  more general linguistic rules.
Underpinning this distinction of  thinking with versus thinking about stories
is an earlier dualism over the construction of  time that Johannes Fabian identified as
lying at the heart of  the anthropological enterprise of  constructing the other and
that he describes as the denial of  coevalness. He defines coevalness as “A persistent
and systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of  anthropology in a Time other
than the present of  the producer of  anthropological discourse” (Fabian 1983, 31).
And yet this denial is premised on a contradiction. For fieldwork to be carried out
“intersubjectivity” must be achieved. Anthropologist and informant must share the
same dialogic experiences in time. “Coevalness has to be created. Communication is,
ultimately about creating shared time.” “Either he submits to the condition of
coevalness and produces ethnographic knowledge, or he deludes himself  into temporal
distance and misses the object of  his search.” (Fabian 1983, 31–32.)
What Fabian has identified here in his own convoluted prose is the experiential
and dialogic context in which ethnographic information is gained and the
decontextualized, timeless generalizations into which such intersubjective experiences
are translated. That intersubjectivity is attacked in different ways by anthropologists
and oral historians as Dudley demonstrates. “Whereas ethnography erases the text-
producing activities of  the informant, oral history erases the text-producing activities
of  the interviewer” (Dudley 1998, 163). However, whatever the site of  erasure the
end result is the same: “A bit of  the real, then, is always sacrificed to gain the appearance
of  the true.” (Dudley 1998, 165.) Portelli makes the same point when he writes: “When
the researcher’s voice is cut out, the narrator’s voice is distorted.” (Portelli 1998, 71.)
ENGAGEMENT WITH THE SOCIAL
So far I have not stepped beyond my first domain of  researcher engagement. It has
taken so much time because recognizing one’s own and the other’s subjectivity is
crucial to identifying the important issues in the other two domains. Let me now
move on to the second domain: the engagement of  individuals with communal forms
of  life. We have come a long way since an anthropologist was able to describe life
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stories as having: “disconcerting tendency to say both more and less than the
anthropologist wishes to hear.” Michael Young (1983, 479) attributes the limitations
of  this genre to “the inability of  even the most intelligent and articulate narrator to
reveal more than the surface structures of  his or her culture”.
 This view is based on a polarization between an essentialized self  and culture,
between informant and researcher and between local knowledge and theoretical
knowledge. However, narratives can be profoundly “knowing” of  the fault lines of
society in a way that earlier anthropologists hardly perceived. Gareth Williams (2004),
for example, in his work with people coping with chronic illness, demonstrates how
lay narratives can incorporate quite sophisticated epidemiological understandings and
social critiques. My own work in Latvia has made connections between illness narratives
and quite radical critiques of  soviet oppression.
LATVIAN CASE STUDIES
In Soviet Latvia narratives of  the body and the self  and shared narratives of  history
collapse into each other. This identification between self  and history has disappeared
with the new individualist ethos of  capitalism. But for the older generation, certain
historical events such as deportations, collectivization and the expropriation of  private
property have had a profound influence on both medical and lay thinking about the
body and illness. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie writes of  a creative event – the evenement
matrice – which destroys traditional structures and brings about new structures
(Ladurie1979, 130). The Soviet occupation of  the Baltic states and its aftermath could
with a certain irony be termed such creative events which called for a radical
restructuring of  medical thinking about the body.
Latvian narrators define their individual illness histories in relationship to
the social world. In particular, autobiographies of  illness are shaped by major turning
points in Soviet history with their inevitable social and individual consequences. One
of  my informants, Mara redefines her own and her family’s health in relation to the
events which followed the Soviet occupation. Illness is the mode in which Latvians
articulate their relationship to history and in doing so transfer it from the private to
the public domain. The experience and narrativization of  illness is deeply politicized
and collectivized. The generous provision of  medical diagnoses as well as medical
care has to be seen in the light of  a highly politicized and historicized lay perspective
on illness.
Mara sets her illness history in the context of  forced collectivization. She
comes from the parish of  Drusti in N.W. Vidzeme. Her farm was located on the
outskirts of  the parish remote from others and surrounded by forest. The policy of
driving people out of  their farms into centralized apartment blocks involved fierce
measures such as blocking up wells and digging up roadways. Here Mara relates her
health difficulties to this process of centralization:
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Well, I began to be ill when I was about twenty. When the children started going to
school at that time I was ill with asthma. I had asthma. If  I worked harder or washed
clothes or got hot then I would suffocate terribly. Well and we lived far from the road so
I couldn’t call the doctor just at that time. So I would wait a little until it was over and
then they would think I was putting it on or something... We didn’t have electricity
there, we weren’t allowed to install it. We were all driven into the villages. Then I
started washing the clothes in a machine and then I didn’t get hot... and then it started
getting better... Of  course my heart had been affected and I got tired easily. So I can’t
say that my health has been good. And with regard to my nerves well [..] it’s clear that
my nerves suffered along with these events. They suffer from all of  that.
This case study illustrates the “thickness” of  medical narratives: Mara’s medical
autobiography reaches out to encompass events and structures in the political arena.
Her medical history bears the signature of  a public history. For this reason medical
encounters frequently turn into social dramas of  the kind described by Victor Turner
(1974): concealed conflicts, opposing interpretations of  the past and present emerge
in the course of  the medical encounter. Patients challenge existing structures in the
light of  their individual experience. The following account of  the doctor’s visit to
Mara’s farmstead during her second pregnancy constitutes such a social drama in
which the conflicting needs of  childbirth and the state’s demands for timber are
pitted against each other. In a society short of  labour power due to war deaths and
deportations the role of  the doctor in granting access to the sick role was particularly
fraught and accusations of  malingering were common. The folk wisdom on this issue
is summed up in an anecdote which Mara recounted to me.
Everyone, men and women, had to work. The women even if  they had small children.
One was only let off  work with a doctor’s certificate. But the doctors were hesitant:
everyone feared deportation. Even the sick couldn’t get a certificate and often they died
working. In hospitals they used the word “malingerer” [Latvian: ‘simulants’] or
rogue. Let me give you an anecdote. In the morning the doctor asks the duty nurse
“What’s new?” She answers, “Nothing much, only the malingerer has died!”
However, this challenge is not issued on a private or ad hoc basis. Rather the experience
of  illness and its emotional reverberations provide a principle mechanism for
transforming private memory into public or social memory. In the course if  this
transformation the body and its historical experience are invested with a rationality
and wisdom of  their own. This cultural configuration reverses certain other powerful
and common stereotypes such as, “a deep-seated cultural stereotype [..] which pictures
the body as an anarch, a lord of  misrule, emblematic of  excess in food, drink, sex,
violence – the embodiment of  the principle which Freud later intellectualized as the
’id’”. (Porter 1991, 217.)
This kind of  work with life histories can challenge their earlier lowly status,
one consequence of  a scientism which dismissed the particular. In Anthony Cohen’s
words there is: “an anthropology to which people – individuals – are almost purely
VIEDA SKULTANS
10
incidental” (Cohen 1996, 29). But the ascendance of  the narrative and life-history
approach has compelled us to recognize our informants as theorists and moral agents
on a par with ourselves. Renato Rosaldo summarizes this as follows: “Indeed, one
strength of  analytical narratives is that they can do so many jobs at once. Unlike more
single-minded hypothetico-deductive propositions, stories can simultaneously
encompass a number of  distinct plot lines and range yet more widely by describing
the lay of  the land, taking overviews of  the situation and providing key background
information (Rosaldo 1980, 91). This recognition is important for the entire social
science enterprise. For oral historians, the situation has been somewhat different
since its origins as an off-shoot of  archival history has placed “an emphasis on truth
and validity rather than meaning” (Summerfield 2000, 92). But equally this has
downplayed the importance of  subjectivity, seeing oral history as an addition to archival
truth. However, the influence of  narrative theory, with its emphasis on form as well
as content, has given rise to a different and enlarged kind of  oral history. Portelli
summarizes this well: “Oral sources tell us not just what people did, but what they
wanted to do, what they believed they were doing, and what they now think they
did.” (Portelli 1998, 67.) The influence of  a particular kind of  interpretive anthropology
is evident here which sees ethnographic understanding as “more like grasping a
proverb, catching an allusion, seeing a joke or [..] reading a poem” (Geertz 1993, 70).
Geertz’s words remind us that much knowledge may be implicit or inarticulate.
ENGAGEMENT WITH THE TEXT
So what are the epistemological and ethical implications of  recognizing the
engagement of  persons with social structure? Although, as mentioned earlier, the
motivations of  researcher and informant are different, both are theorists trying to
make sense of  the past. Perhaps, making sense or seeing a pattern in the particularities
and twists and turns of  a life constitute one of  the greatest challenges for theoretical
understanding. The ethical consequence of  this is that we treat our informants’ world-
view with the same respect we accord our own.
 Let me now move onto my final domain and the problem of  translation,
which cuts across all the issues discussed so far. Translation is involved when we
move from one modality to another, be that from culture to culture, from person to
person, from orality to textuality, from experience to narrative and from local embodied
knowledge to generalization. Thus translation involves the personal engagement of
the researcher. George Steiner writes: “Thus a human being performs an act of
translation, in the full sense of  the word, when performing a speech-message from
any other human being. Time, distance, disparities in outlook or assumed reference
make this act more or less difficult.” (Steiner 1992, 48.) But translation rests upon an
assumption of  a more basic proficiency. Hans G. Gadamer reminds us of  the radical
difference between learning a first language and learning a second language. In learning
a first language our very world is brought into being. But learning a new language
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“involves acquiring a new standpoint in regard to one’s previous worldview.” (Gadamer
1989, 441.) It also requires translation and interpretation in a way that learning a first
language does not. But there is no mediating third language in this translation unless
as George Gellner suggests “Reality itself  could be this kind of  mediator and third
language” (Gellner 1970, 25).
But as we know, reality is a fuzzy and slippery concept and we are better off
here with the idea of  shared experience, in our case the ethnographic interview. And
here I want to introduce the idea of  unequal languages and translation as a political
act (Alvarez & Vidal, 1996). Talal Asad (1986, 157) has pointed out how translator’s
have a greater reverence for their own language than the language of  the other. The
task of  the translator is to move between, their first language and the foreign language
or culture and between experiential and theoretical understanding without seeking to
impose one upon the other. Here we return to the importance of  recognizing our
informants as theorists. The ethnographer must draw new meanings from quasi
incommensurable worlds. There are no all-encompassing dictionaries in which to
check whether our translations are correct. But if  successful the creative act of
translation will give “language life beyond the moment and place of  immediate
utterance” (Steiner 1992, 28).
Let me spell out what I mean by incommensuralibity across modalities and
the kind of  calls upon creativity that these require. The incommensurability of  cultures
is familiar to us since the work of  Wittgenstein and his discussions of  forms of  life.
For this reason translation, as Asad points out, has been the key concern of  the
structural-functionalist school of  Anthropology. The incommensurability of  personal
experience is the focus of  the problem of  other minds. Orality and textuality have
been discussed in terms of  the subservience of  speech to text but I wish to discuss
their incommensurability and problems of  transcription by focusing on the nature
of  eloquence in speech and writing. Literal transcriptions are often unreadable. A
faithful translation from spoken to written word often loses the power and eloquence
of  the spoken narrative. In other words, eloquence in speech is not the same as
eloquence in writing. Hence, there is an urge to tidy up speech in transcription in
order not to render an eloquent speaker inarticulate. Again an act of  creative
interpretation is called for. So successful transcription “does not mark a technical
achievement facilitated by a shared code of  practice of  transcribing but rather
celebrates the beginnings of  a dialogue made by giving narrative shape to an individual’s
life project” (Skultans 2000, 9). Elliot Mishler refers to this as “the essential
indeterminacy and ambiguity of  the relationship between language and meaning”
(Mishler 1991, 235). And finally we have the movement from the embodied experiential
ethnographic setting to stored verbal knowledge. There is an implicit contract between
researchers and informants that we will know how to negotiate this modality and give
a different shape to the relived experiences. This is particularly so with painful
experiences and memories. If, as Michael Bell points out, there is no contract in life,
the contract in narrative is all the more important (Bell 1999, 175). What characterises
all these moves across modalities is the absence of  one-to-one correspondences and




Insofar as ethnography and oral history are hermeneutic disciplines, interpretation is
fundamental to all aspects of  their work and ranges across different pairs of  modality.
Our two disciplines call for a dialogic engagement with the other across the full range
of  human subjectivity, from embodied experience to cultural abstraction. For
anthropologists this has involved moving away from Pascal’s position summed up in
the dictum. “We have truth, they have tradition”. More recently anthropologists have
argued against the neglect of  the self  in ethnographic work.
A more recent movement in Anthropology has challenged this position. For
example, Cohen has argued extensively against the neglect of  the self  by
anthropologists: “Anthropologists did not attribute any importance to the problem
of  what these structures actually meant to those who populated them. In this kind of
theoretical scheme, people, individuals, were important only as structures in themselves,
or as related to structure in some identifiable way.” By contrast Cohen argues that
individuals construct their relationship to society on their own terms. (Cohen 1994,
14, 79.)
The position that Cohen is challenging is exemplified in the work of  Ed-
mund Leach among others. He wrote: “The stories that I am interested in are repetitive
and in some degree “traditional”; I am not concerned with one-off  inventions of
children struggling to gain control of  syntax or learning to imitate models that meet
with the approval of  their elders.” (Leach 1984, 361.) Leach, with his inimitable
combination of  radicalism and upper class authoritativeness, would not have seen
himself  as a mouthpiece for any social group. He would I feel sure have wanted his
contribution to Anthropology to be seen as unique rather than a replica of  anyone
else. And yet in doing ethnographic fieldwork he was denying that importance to
others.
Oral historians on the other hand have moved from a recognition of  the
particularity of  their subjects to a recognition of  their informants as creators of
cultural meaning. The movement can be characterized by a variation of  Rosaldo’s
account of  fieldwork among the Ilongots. He came looking for culture but found
history. “And through their history I discovered culture in a renewed sense” (1980,
90). Conversely it could be said of  oral historians that they were looking for history
and found culture and through culture rediscovered a renewed sense of  history.
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